Anti-dualismo no discurso sobre o Antropoceno by Sylla, Bernhard
 ANTI-DUALISM IN THE DISCOURSE ON THE ANTHROPOCENE 





Abstract: 18 years after its introduction into scientific vocabulary, a vast discourse on the 
Anthropocene has settled in very heterogeneous scientific areas, from Biology and Geology 
to the Arts and Humanities, including Philosophy itself. 
Despite its multidisciplinarity, there seems to be a common presupposition in this 
discourse that often becomes a demand: to abandon a false dualism allegedly responsible 
for the lack of answers to the challenges that the new anthropocenic age poses to us. Anti-
dualism seems to be a common denominator, widely shared by the most diverse authors of 
the Anthropocene discourse, but what is meant by ‘dualism’ seems extremely 
heterogeneous to me, embracing ontological, epistemological, and political dimensions, 
and sometimes mixing them. Whatever the combated dualism – nature and culture, social 
system and terrestrial system, Man and Earth, biosphere and noosphere, subject and object, 
observer and observed, natural sciences and human sciences, etc. – the golden key to 
unravelling and developing a different way of thinking and being capable of facing the 
environmental challenges of the present would be by overcoming these dualisms, that is, in 
a perspective that can account for the intersection and overlap of the hitherto opposed 
elements and which presupposes, in the end, their assimilation. How both imbrication and 
assimilation can or should be thought of, however, can vary greatly from one author to 
another. 
Based on these assumptions, I will focus on two criticisms of anti-dualism put forward 
by Andrew Feenberg and Gernot Böhme. Both critics chose the theories of Haraway and 
Latour – authors who are today among the most cited philosophers of the Anthropocene – 
as distinct exponents of anti-dualism. I will argue that criticism of anti-dualism is pertinent 
and necessary, but that the alternatives proposed by Feenberg and Böhme are not 
convincing. 
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Sumário: 18 anos após a sua introdução no vocabulário científico existe um vasto discurso 
sobre o Antropoceno que se instalou em áreas científicas muito heterogéneas, desde a 
Biologia e Geologia até às Artes e Humanidades, inclusive na própria Filosofia. 
Apesar da sua multidisciplinariedade, parece haver neste discurso um pressuposto 
comum que, não raras vezes, se transforma numa exigência: a de abandonar um falso 
dualismo alegadamente responsável pela falta de respostas aos desafios que a nova era 
antropocénica nos coloca. O antidualismo parece ser um denominador comum,  
largamente partilhado pelos mais diversos autores do discurso sobre o Antropoceno, mas 
aquilo que se entende por ‘dualismo’ parece-me extremamente heterogéneo, abrangendo 
dimensões ontológicas, epistemológicas e políticas, e, por vezes, misturando-as. Seja qual 
for o dualismo combatido – natureza e cultura, sistema social e sistema terrestre, Homem e 
Terra, biosfera e noosfera, sujeito e objeto, observador e observado, ciências da natureza e 
ciências humanas, etc. –, a chave de ouro para desencerrar e desenvolver um pensamento 
diferente, capaz de enfrentar os desafios ambientais do tempo presente, estaria na 
superação destes dualismos, i. e., numa perspetiva capaz não apenas de dar conta da 
intersecção e imbricação dos elementos até então opostos, mas que pressupõe, no fundo, a 
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sua equiparação. Como se pode ou deve pensar tanto a imbricação como a equiparação, 
pode, no entanto, variar bastante de um autor para outro. 
Com base nestes pressupostos, focar-me-ei em duas críticas do antidualismo, 
apresentadas por Andrew Feenberg e por Gernot Böhme. Ambas as críticas escolheram as 
teorias de Haraway e Latour – autores que se encontram, hoje em dia, entre os mais 
citados filósofos do pensamento sobre o Antropoceno – como representantes distintos do 
antidualismo. Defenderei que a crítica ao antidualismo é pertinente e necessária, mas que 
as versões propostas por Feenberg e Böhme não convencem.  
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1. Some examples of anti-dualistic theses in the Anthropocene discourse 
Without wishing to be exhaustive, I would like to give some examples of the 
formulation of anti-dualistic theses in the Anthropocene discourse. The number of 
examples could be expanded arbitrarily because as stated in the introduction, I am 
convinced that the anti-dualistic perspective has advanced to a kind of common sense 
conviction. The few examples I give here provide a first insight into the heterogeneity 
of what can be meant by anti-dualistic theses. I proceed in such a way that I quote a few 
selected passages or statements from articles and then comment briefly on their content 
implications. 
 
The Anthropocene perspective is one that encapsulates a world of 
intertwined drivers, complex dynamic structures, emergent phenomena and 
unintended consequences, manifest across different scales and within 
interlinked biophysical constraints and social conditions. (Bai, X. et al. 
2016: 351) 
 
Implicit here is that ‘social conditions’ and ‘biophysical constraints’ are directly linked, 
i.e., it is implied that they are to be regarded as relata, which, to put it mildly, are 
neither incommensurable nor totally heterogeneous, nor do they belong to ontologically 
completely different systems. In many other texts, only the designations of the two 
relata change. The common feature, that a dualism of seemingly heterogeneous realms 
of being should be abolished, remains. Although many authors do not explicitly 
distinguish between being, thinking, and acting, these three levels are often referred to. 
On the ontological level, they hold that the separation of nature and culture is not 
justified, in epistemological terms we would have to rethink and also reorganize the 
traditional areas of science, and in practical-ethical-political terms we would have to 
change our norms and act differently. The following two quotes are examples of the 
‘mingled’ reference to the three dimensions of being, thinking and acting: 
We argue that, because what currently counts as ‘environmental’ is also 
social (or, in some accounts, ‘biosocial’ or ‘naturalcultural’). (…) We 
suggest that the new era, characterized by measurable global human impact 
– the so called Anthropocene – does not just imply conflation of the natural 
and the social, but also a ‘radical’ change in perspective and action in terms 
of human awareness of and responsibility for a vulnerable earth. (…) It is 
now time for us to articulate the culture of emerging Anthropocene societies 
by drawing upon natural scientists, humanities scholars, and social scientists, 
emphasizing the new fusion of the natural and the ideational, (…). (Palsson, 
G. et al. 2013: 4; 7) 
 
(…) the ecological crisis we are facing today will not be solved by new 
policies to restrict industrial pollution, the preservation of natural resources 
or the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The ecological crisis is rooted 
in anthropocentric humanism (...). This humanism is characterized by a 
fundamental dualism between humankind and nature (...). (Blok 2014: 309) 
 
Based on this assumption, some, but not all of the authors draw the epistemological 
conclusion that a correct and appropriate scientific view should not be environmentalist, 
because it is still based on the false assumption of a present opposition between agent 
and environment. Environmentalism must therefore be replaced by a non-dualistic 
unified science, which is often referred to as Earth System science. 
Ecology is the science of the relationship between organisms and their local 
environments, whereas Earth System science is the science of the whole 
Earth as a complex system beyond the sum of its parts. (…) The 
Anthropocene concerns human impacts on the Earth System, not on the 
environment. (Hamilton 2015: 1f.) 
 
Some radical ecocentrics, or radical environmentalists, are undoubtedly anti-dualists, 
but differ from Earth System scientists in applying anti-dualism only to all living beings, 
not to all entities. Often exponents of the anti-dualism thesis also draw political 
consequences, demanding that all beings or, as we shall see in Latour, all entities should 
be given a right to participation or at least representative participation in democratic 
decision-making. As an example for authors who hold a moderate position, that is, who 
maintain thinking in the context of today’s notions of political representation, I quote a 
short passage from Dryzek:  
The claims [of climate politicians] include deliberation’s ability to integrate 
the interests and perspectives of diverse actors (scientists, public officials, 
activists and others) concerned with different aspects of complex issues, 
promote public goods and generalizable interests, enlarge the perspectives 
of participants by bringing to mind those not physically present such as 
future generations and non-human nature, and organizing feedback on the 
state of social-ecological systems into political processes. (Dryzek 2014: 12) 
 
In terms of a first conclusion, we may say that the anti-dualism in the 
Anthropocene debate tends to establish ontological, epistemological and ethical-
political claims, although these three domains are not always clearly distinguished and 
explicated. If one wants to reflect critically on the anti-dualistic theses, one should 
consider these differences. 
In the following, I will analyse the anti-dualistic theses of D. Haraway and B. 
Latour in more detail. Both are not only outstanding authors of the debate on the 
Anthropocene, but at the same time are the authors to which Feenberg and Böhme 
addressed their criticisms. 
 
2. Anti-dualism in Latour and Haraway 
2.1. Anti-dualism in Latour 
Latour’s anti-dualism is complex and has been elaborated in many of his 
writings. A basic requirement for this anti-dualism is Latour’s understanding of a type 
of thought that he designates with the term ‘modernity.’ In particular, in his work Nous 
n'avons jamais été modernes 58 , published in 1991 and translated into numerous 
languages, Latour explicates that this age, termed ‘modern,’ has produced a dualism that 
is, as a matter of fact, non-existent. Latour describes his hypothesis as follows: 
The hypothesis of this essay is that the word ‘modern’ designates two sets of 
entirely different practices which must remain distinct if they are to remain 
effective, but have recently begun to be confused. The first set of practices, 
by ‘translation’, creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, 
hybrids of nature and culture. The second, by ‘purification’, creates two 
entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; 
that of nonhumans on the other. (Latour 1993: 10f.) 
 
Responsible for the false and, as we shall see, dangerous ‘second set of practices’ 
is a dualism that rigorously separates the two macro-spheres of nature and culture. This 
separation, which Latour lets begin with Hobbes and Boyle and the reception of their 
works, corresponds to a strategy that seeks a clear and, above all, exclusive attribution 
of ontological, epistemological and ethical-political valences, competencies and roles. 
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Nature becomes an exclusive subject of the natural sciences, excluded from the 
political-ethical discourse and separated from the human sciences. In parallel to this 
profound dualism which becomes the absolutely dominant and unquestioned type of 
thought and action, entities are permanently created that simply undermine this dualism 
because they are mixtures of the natural and the social. Therefore, they were always 
there but were ignored and, so to speak, suppressed in modernity, especially in scientific, 
normative, and political terms. 
Ontologically, these hybrids are not just mixtures of the discrete areas of nature 
and culture. What is new about Latour is that hybrids contain not only entities of the 
object class, but also of the class of relations (see Latour 1993: 111-114), for example, 
“CO2, sea levels, plant nodules or algae, in addition to the many different factions of 
fighting humans” (Latour 2013: 103), i.e., relationships that, together with the hybrid 
and non-hybrid object entities, form a network and have agent or actor status. However, 
the very challenge of Latour’s theory lies not in the ontological field but in the 
epistemological and ethical-political. While a simple anti-dualism and anti-
anthropocentrism, as it is represented in countless articles, wants us as humans to 
radically rethink our being (ontology), our thinking (epistemology) as well as our doing 
(ethics and politics), a radical anti-dualism would like to go a step further because it 
argues that the means of radical change, that is, being, thinking and acting itself, must 
be ‘de-humanized.’ Despite all radicalism, Latour does not abandon the orientation in 
the three categories of theos, nomos, and demos. In the present context, I cannot deal 
with all the difficulties that the redefinition of these categories raises, above all not with 
the questions of the function of religion and the instance of God, as well as its further 
replacement by the Gaia principle. By contrast, I would like to briefly discuss some 
aspects that affect the nomos and demos domains. 
The new onticity of the world poses new nomological and political challenges, 
according to Latour. The nomological ones concern what he calls “agency distribution” 
(ibid., 44) and their principles. This distribution and the determination of its principles 
seem to me, on the one hand, to occur ‘on their own’; and on the other hand, they can or 
should be coordinated and this coordination makes demands on a new policy. This 
requires a brief explanation. 
By itself (‘on its own’), agency distribution takes place in that agents or species 
of agents occupy their place in the overall context of all entities in an autonomous 
manner, and that is, in their peculiar manner and in compliance with the specific 
conditions of their self-preservation and best possible proliferation. In line with Carl 
Schmitt, Latour also assumes that at this stage of the new community of all agents it can 
become quite normal that groups of agents can be totally alien to each other, that there 
are conflicts of interest which are serious and in which the survival of a group of entities 
is at stake, and that there is no third impartial Arbitration Panel competent and 
authorized to resolve or settle these conflicts from the position of a sovereign judge. 
Given this Hobbesian scenario of a war of all against all, there is a need for the 
members of this ‘state of agents’ to agree on their claims, rights, and duties. One 
difficulty in Latour’s conception of this challenge is that candidates for recognized 
membership in that state have to prove their entitlement to membership:  
Instead, what I propose to say is that, in this new cosmopolitical situation, 
those who wish to present themselves to other collectives have to specify 
what sort of people they are, to state what is the entity or divinity that they 
hold as their supreme guarantee and to identify the principles by which they 
distribute agencies throughout their cosmos (Latour 2013: 83). 
 
But how can an entity that cannot speak do the three named actions – specify, 
state, and identify? Even Latour cannot avoid the fact that this is only possible through 
representation, and that means that these entities have to be interpreted and represented 
by conscious living beings, who were designated in Politics of Nature as ‘spokespersons’ 
and identified with scientists (see Latour 2004, 64ff.).59 The problem of this situation, 
however, is greatly increased by the fact that the hybrid agents are produced not only in 
most cases by man himself, but also by the fact that democratic decisions in the new 
Gaia state have an existential weight. They decide over life and death, or in other words, 
they decide about the date of birth and the expiry date of these hybrids: “the production 
of hybrids, by becoming explicit and collective, becomes the object of an enlarged 
democracy that regulates or slows down its cadence.” (Latour 2013, 141). 
However, Latour’s conception is most questionable where ethics and morality 
are concerned. The thesis already held in 1991 that the attitude of modernity not only 
led to crime (see the subchapter entitled “Avoid Adding New Crimes to Old,” Latour 
1993: 125-127), but also – in domains like politics, economics and science – to an 
unbearable totalitarianism (ibid., 125f.), resembles rather a capital insinuation and is, 
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even in later works of Latour, not satisfactorily justified. As a remedy against crime and 
totalitarianism, Latour suggests a kind of a connectivism or relativism: 
When we abandon the modern world, we do not fall upon someone or 
something, we do not land on an essence, but on a process, on a movement, 
a passage – literally a pass, in the sense of this term as used in ball games. 
(...) We start from the vinculum itself, from passages and relations, not 
accepting as a starting point any being that does not emerge from this 
relation that is at once collective, real and discursive. (Latour 1993: 129) 
 
As a decisive positive feature of connectivism, its transparency is emphasized, 
i.e., that relations as such are not suppressed or ignored, but become conscious and 
accessible to debate in political committees. However, it seems to me to be problematic 
if the awareness and transparency of the production and connection of hybrids become 
the decisive criterion of morality, as the following statement by Latour seems to claim: 
Reveal its [of the human species] work of mediation, and it will take on 
human form. Conceal it again, and we shall have to talk about inhumanity, 
even if it is draping itself in the Bill of Rights. (Latour 1993: 137) 
 
The problem, however, is not only the reduction of ethics and morality to 
functioning and transparent relationships, but also the blatant contradiction that, on one 
hand, the status and meaning of the typical human thought, action, and being undergoes 
a significant degradation which almost leads to its elimination, and that, on the other 
hand, one demands a lot more from human thinking and action than in modern times: 
not only to produce hybrids and scientifically illuminate their connectivity in a manner 
that is understandable to all fellow citizens, but also to represent these hybrids 
politically and to decide on their lifespan and life entitlement. Faced with an extreme 
downgrade and an extreme upgrade, man now fills the gap between nothingness and 
God, a result that clearly contradicts Latour’s very concerns. 
 
2.2. Anti-dualism in Haraway 
I will only briefly comment on Haraway’s anti-dualism because this seems 
sufficient to me in the analysis presented here. Haraway’s and Latour’s ideas meet in 
some essential points and therefore it is not surprising that Haraway sees in Latour one 
of the closest and most prominent companions in defence of her anti-dualistic 
worldview (see Haraway 2016: 43). On the other hand, she also distances herself from 
Latour (ibid.), and this demarcation may have to be even clearer than Haraway herself 
expresses it. I would like to explain this very briefly. 
I would argue that the strongest resemblance between Latour and Haraway lies 
in their ontological premises. The extension of the terms hybrid, actant or agent in 
Latour and critter or cyborg in Haraway certainly has a large overlap. When Haraway 
defines her use of the terms ‘cyborg’ or, later on, ‘critter’, potential elements of this 
species are “microbes, plants, animals, humans and nonhumans, and sometimes even 
(...) machines.” (ibid., 169). Even though all these entities are also involved in relations, 
it seems to me that Haraway does not want to allow relations as such, i.e., relational 
universals, as species members.60 Haraway herself mentions two other parallels: “Like 
Stengers and like myself, Latour is a thoroughgoing materialist committed to an ecology 
of practices” (ibid., 42). With regard to the first feature, materialism, I would add that in 
both authors this does not lead to a complete suppression of the transcendent. I only 
briefly mentioned this aspect with regard to Latour and, here too, I will not elaborate on 
it. As far as the ecology of practice is concerned, I see more differences than similarities. 
On the one hand, Haraway rejects Latour’s recourse to Carl Schmitt and thus the 
idea of a war of all against all as movens of a representative democracy: “Schmitt’s 
enemies do not allow the story to change in its marrow; the Earthbound need a more 
tentacular, less binary life story. Latour’s Gaia stories deserve better companions in 
storytelling than Schmitt.” (ibid., 43). Secondly, the function of the political 
representation of all entities, emphasized by Latour, does not seem to play a significant 
role in Haraway’s arguments. Democratic and decision-making processes are 
presupposed in their present form and, in principle, are not considered to be in need of 
reform. On their basis, the major changes happen and these concern rather separate 
oikoi than the global world. Haraway rejects total perspectives which is in some ways 
consistent because the way we think is, according to Haraway, quite a material thing 
and of material importance: “The question of whom to think-with is immensely material” 
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(ibid.). Ecology of practice is practical ecology, and that practical ecology is 
implemented in limited, manageable spaces, even though it naturally has significance 
for the ecology of the whole, the Earth. The aim of a limited ecological practice is to 
create protective refuge or retreat spaces in which the relations between “microbes, 
plants, animals, humans and nonhumans, and sometimes even machines” can flourish. 
Haraway calls this ecological practice also ‘composting,’ and composting requires not 
only the material association or fusion but also the selection of the compost partner. 
Instead of the concept of holistic ecology, where all have to live together, here the 
limited ‘domestic’ cohabitation becomes central (“The brand of holist ecological 
philosophy that emphasizes that ‘everything is connected to everything,’ will not help 
us here. Rather, everything is connected to something, which is connected to something 
else.” (ibid., 173)). This conception, which declares itself as feminist and combines 
ideas, suggestions, and realizations of ecological practice with feminist practice, 
combats a type of thought and action that tolerates or systematically includes 
destruction, domination, and oppression: especially capitalism, environmental 
destruction and typical patriarchal forms of discrimination. The present age in which the 
confrontation between old and new forms of life takes place and must take place, 
Haraway calls Chtulhucene. It is the age which would have to begin now because of the 
imminent collapse of planet Earth. She describes it like this: 
My Chthulucene, even burdened with its problematic Greekish tendrils, 
entangles myriad temporalities and spatialities and diverse intra-active 
entities-in-assemblages – including the more-than human, other-than-human, 
inhuman, and human-as-humus. The symchthonic ones are not extinct, but 
they are mortal. One way to live and die well as mortal critters in the 
Chthulucene is to join forces to reconstitute refuges, to make possible partial 
and robust biological-cultural-political-technological recuperation and 
recomposition, which must include mourning irreversible losses. (Haraway 
2016: 192) 
 
For Haraway, man’s hybrid connection with other entities is no problem at all, 
just as minor as radical changes of the material constitution of man through technology. 
 
3. Anti-anti-dualism: the criticisms of Böhme and Feenberg 
The criticisms directed to Haraway and Latour by the authors Gernot Böhme and 
Andrew Feenberg are very interesting for two principal reasons. (i) They cannot be 
understood as traditional-classical criticisms which brand anti-dualism as irrational and 
dangerous and do not want to give up the ‘modern’ dualism. Rather, both authors 
emphasize that Haraway and Latour are perfectly right in their ontological diagnosis of 
the increasing hybridity of entities in the world today. However, they emphasize that 
this diagnosis should not lead to total suppression of duality since such a one-
dimensional view would not only be uncritical but also dangerous. It is therefore 
important to recognize dualistic dynamics in anti-dualism itself. Hence, this criticism 
could also be characterized as anti-anti-dualism or dualistic anti-dualism. (ii) On the 
other hand, both critiques are also important because they highlight an aspect that was 
not explicitly raised as a problem in our analysis until now: the function of technology. 
The key point of the critiques is that in the context of the required recognition of 
hybrids, the reflection on the function and role of technology is inadequate. However, as 
far as the logical connection between reflection on the function of technology and 
suppressed dualism is concerned, the criticisms of the two authors differ considerably. I 
would like to briefly comment on both critiques before I draw the last general 
conclusions. 
 
3.1. Anti-anti-dualism in Böhme 
The text by Böhme, which I would like to refer to here and in which he 
expresses his criticism of Haraway and Latour dates back to 2002 but is as relevant 
today as in the year it was written, although he obviously could not have taken the more 
recent texts by Haraway and Latour into account.  
Böhme first emphasizes that Haraway and Latour are correct in their ontological 
diagnosis of our age: the increasing hybridization of our reality is undoubtedly already a 
fact as shown by a look at reproductive medicine, transplantation medicine and genetic 
engineering. Therefore, it is not surprising that some authors, such as Haraway and 
Latour, make this fact a desideratum: 
In this situation it is not surprising that there are authors who, as it were, 
seek refuge in attack, declare the old European self-understanding of the 
human being to be obsolete, and disdainfully jettison those – supposedly 
modern – dichotomies: nature/technology, nature/culture, nature/civilization, 
nature/spirit. The human being is a hybrid, according to Bruno Latour, or a 
cyborg, according to Donna Haraway, and that’s a good thing, they say, and 
freedom consists in grasping this. (Böhme 2002: 8) 
 
Following Böhme, Haraway’s feminist-socialist approach blurs the criticism of 
the dualism of modernity with the rejection of the patriarchal meta-narratives, in which 
the oppression of the weaker is structurally anchored. Cyborgism is linked not only to 
the rescue of the pleasure principle beyond its anchoring in gender thinking, but also 
linked to the liberation from the oppressive thinking in oppositional fundamental 
categories. 
Her decision is therefore to have “pleasure in the confusion of boundaries”, 
(Haraway 1991 [sic] 61 , 150) 62  that is, she emphatically welcomes the 
metamorphosis of the human being into a cyborg, a metamorphosis that 
transpires partly through a fusion of the human being’s organism with 
cybernetic machines, and partly through his or her absorption into networks. 
(Böhme 2002: 8) 
 
Böhme’s criticism is simple and clear: even if Haraway’s unsentimentality and intrepid 
reality diagnosis is correct and deserves to be appreciated, it is nevertheless uncritical 
and corresponds to a kind of wishful thinking coupled with a naive new affirmation: 
What we can value in Donna Haraway is her sober, indeed, fearless account 
of what is actually happening to the human being. However, one wonders 
whether her form of critique (...) is not much more than the call to make the 
best of it. (...) What is called critique becomes affirmation because every 
standard for critique was already relinquished at the outset with the 
abandonment of all differentiations. (Böhme 2002: 9) 
 
Böhme’s assessment of Latour is almost identical. He appreciates his correct and 
unsentimental diagnosis of the current state of civilization – “What is impressive about 
Bruno Latour’s large-scale project – like Haraway’s project – is above all the 
unreserved recognition of the state of our civilization.” (Böhme 2002: 10) –, but 
criticizes the omission of a criterion for our actions, and that is, the uncritical nature of 
Latour’s theory: 
This [Latour’s] analysis is correct and therefore Latour’s proposal to turn 
modern thinking inside out, that is, to proceed conceptually from the center, 
has to be taken very seriously. But one wonders whether he can in this way 
find a new basis for critique or – to say it once more – a criterion for the 
choice between hybrids, which would then no longer be termed hybrids. 
(Böhme 2002: 9) 
 
It seems now that Böhme is only concerned with adding the missing critical 
moment to the basically correct theories of Haraway and Latour: “The question arises as 
to whether his call to proceed conceptually from the center might not be answered in the 
form of a critical theory.” (ibid., 11). Latour’s suggestion to fill the gap between matter 
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and mind, natural and social, and the humanities and natural sciences by starting ‘from 
the centre,’ or, in other words, to recognize the hybrids that have always existed in this 
centre, contains an uncritical moment because all entities are drawn to a one-
dimensional level which allows no differentiation. That is why Böhme is concerned 
with reintroducing differentiation or giving it back its right of existence. Instead of 
starting from hybrids, as Latour and Haraway do, Böhme returns to the human being 
and anchors in him the common ground from which duality is created. Duality is now 
related to the opposition ‘body and its scientific-objective appropriation’ versus 
‘autonomous subject.’ However, both poles are only possible if they are related to the 
more original ‘self-givenness,’ which is the source of the two poles. Self-givenness 
holds in itself the critical potential that is lacking in the category of hybrids, it is the 
centre out of which duality develops. Only its reflexive assertion guarantees the 
overcoming and reversal of a false dualism, i.e. guarantees the realization of the project 
that Haraway and Latour have written on their flags: 
Because the body and the autonomous ego are products of a differentiation 
from the original concerned self-givenness, they cannot be assumed in any 
way to be immovably given – its constellation always remains precarious. In 
insufferable pain, in shock, lust, or through meditation, body and 
autonomous ego can indeed disappear again, in regression to the original 
concerned self-givenness. I claim that sovereign human beings will have to 
keep this possibility open. They will refuse to stylize themselves into 
autonomous subjects, not only because this is an illusion but also because 
they would lose contact with everything that affects, that concerns them. On 
the other hand, they will refuse to objectivize their corporeality [Leib] 
completely into a body because they would lose their original self-givenness 
in corporeal sensing. (…) In the concept of a differentiation of the body and 
the autonomous subject from original concerned self-givenness, on the one 
hand, and in the idea of the sovereign human being, on the other, we have 
the theoretical-practical background for a critical theory of human nature. 
(Böhme 2002: 12f.) 
 
Böhme’s criticism may well have its justification, but it does not raise a 
particularly strong argument against the anti-dualists, for in the end it conservatively 
advocates a return to anthropocentrism which the anti-dualists consider to be the main 
reason for the catastrophic situation of the planet Earth (and with it of humanity). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Böhme also returns in a somewhat conservative 
manner to the antagonism between man and machine held by the technophobic theories 
of the second half of the 20th century. Since the overcoming of a false dualism lies in 
the hands of humans, and technological manipulation of the body threatens to sabotage 
this overcoming, technologization and hybridization are stigmatized and move into the 
enemy camp – in evident opposition to anti-dualistic theories. According to Böhme, this 
opposition is not only legitimate but it is also the highest ethical maxim: 
Human dignity is threatened today by the technologization of the human 
body. This leads to the fact that to be human must be defined no longer in 
demarcation from animality or deity but in demarcation from the machine. 
(…) we would have to formulate the maxim of the sovereign human being 
as folIows: “To learn to live and to die and, in order to be a human being, to 
refuse to be a machine.” (Böhme 2002: 13f.) 
 
3.2. Anti-anti-dualism in Feenberg 
Feenberg’s text Transforming Technology, published in 2002, which I consider 
here, can not only be regarded as one of the author’s most important texts on the role of 
technology in a critical theory of society, but also offers the advantage that Feenberg 
expressly refers to Latour and Haraway. 
Like Böhme, Feenberg believes that Haraway and Latour are right in their 
ontological diagnosis of reality. The mixture of nature and social, technical and natural 
that they have stated is an undeniable reality. However, according to Feenberg, Latour 
and Haraway do not adequately cover this hybrid zone. Feenberg’s position could be 
summarized as follows: The hybrid zone is primarily of a technological nature, but it is 
not one-dimensional, and that is, it is neither exclusively ‘evil’/dangerous nor neutral, as 
claimed by virtually all modern and postmodern philosophies of technology during the 
twentieth century, but is fundamentally dual. Although posthumanists, including Latour 
and Haraway, differ from those previous theories in that they now hold a technophile 
position, they still reduce technology to a false one-dimensionality. It is therefore 
necessary to first explain what Feenberg means by ‘two-dimensionality’ of technology. 
I would like to highlight two particular moments. First, technology is a two-dimensional 
phenomenon because it involves a relationship between agent and object. This 
relationship has social meaning and is, especially when the object is a human being, an 
expression of a power relationship. On the other hand, also to the object itself as a 
technological product inheres a two-dimensionality because it is not neutral but contains 
an ethical maxim in itself: “Ethics is not only discursively and in action but in artefacts.” 
(Feenberg 2002: 21). If we reduce technology to one-dimensionality, we ignore its 
ethical dimension. 
Technology is a two-sided phenomenon: on the one hand, there is the 
operator; on the other, the object. Where both operator and object are human 
beings, technical action is an exercise of power. Where, further, society is 
organized around technology, technological power is the principal form of 
power in the society. One-dimensionality results from the difficulty of 
criticizing this form of power in terms of traditional concepts of justice, 
freedom, equality, and so on. (Feenberg 2002: 16) 
 
We can also put it this way: to co-emergent, hybrid entities inhere a two-
dimensionality and an ethical decision that should not be suppressed, because otherwise 
there would be no scope for those phenomena that aren’t possible without duality, as 
there are: consciousness, awareness of difference, awareness of contingency, awareness 
of optionality, decision-making, and, ultimately, ethical decision. In addition, duality is 
also conceptually indispensable because if the duality of knowing and the known is 
suppressed, then the signifier ‘hybrid’ becomes, according to Feenberg, a word without 
meaning and ultimately a term without reference, since even reference without duality 
cannot exist (see ibid., 30). The suppression of duality also has normative 
consequences: since the new standard of posthumanists is that of network functioning, a 
discrimination that only makes sense when based on a separation of nature and social 
meaning can no longer be valued rationally and falls away. Thus, a new discrimination 
creeps in, as the entity that does not know how to integrate into the network is 
automatically excluded: 
This has disturbing normative implications. It means, for example, that the losers’ 
perspective in any struggle disappears from view as it cannot be operationalized 
in terms of the nature/society distinction realized in the structure of the network. 
(Feenberg 2002: 31) 
 
Latour had responded to this critique (Latour 1999), but, in Feenberg’s opinion, 
his answer was anything but convincing: 
 
Latour agrees that it must be possible to resist the definition of reality 
imposed by the victors in the struggle for control of the network. (...) True 
democracy must protect public access for entities and persons hitherto 
excluded from consideration, while also ensuring that new elements and 
voices be integrated harmoniously with the established structure of the 
network. In sum, allowance must be made for the intervention of the new 
and unpredictable while preserving the network from incoherence and 
collapse (Latour, 1999: 172-173). So far so good. Latour recognizes the 
problem of participation by subordinate actors and offers a solution. But one 
would like to know how these actors are to argue for the reforms they desire 
without reference to any transcendent sanction. Morality in this new theory 
is now confined to holding the collective open to new claimants and 
ordering its members in a hierarchy (Latour, 1999: 213). (…) On Latour’s 
account, morality is no longer based on principles but on these operational 
rules. (Feenberg 2002: 31f.) 
 
Feenberg’s argument is therefore that we live in a world with an increasing 
amount of hybrid entities, most of which technologically produced. They contain ethical 
maxims that we are often unaware of. But the ability to account for these ethical 
maxims, to recognize them as an option and to deal with them ethically is only possible 
for humans. 
It [Feenberg’s theory] retains the commonsense notion that human actors 
have unique reflexive capacities. These capacities make it possible for 
humans to represent the networks in which they “emerge” and to measure 
them against unrealized potentialities identified in thought. Reflexivity of 
this sort is essentially different from the contributions of nonhuman actors, 
and forms the basis for social struggles that may challenge or disrupt the 
networks and even reconfigure them in new forms. These reconfigurations 
have an ethical dimension that cannot be explained on posthumanist terms. 
(Feenberg 2002: 34) 
 
The responsibility that humans have in dealing with technology poses ethical-political 
challenges which, according to Feenberg, can only be adequately addressed if radical 
socio-political consequences are drawn. Neither capitalism nor communism provide the 
conditions for this transformation, but only a social reorganization that guarantees a 
radical democratic participation of all citizens in politics, industry, economy and all 
other areas of society. In addition, of course, it also requires insight into the value-
ladenness, that is, the two-dimensionality of technology. 
I show that the control-oriented attributes of technology emphasized in 
capitalist and communist societies do not exhaust its potentialities. A 
fundamentally different form of civilization will emphasize other attributes 
of technology compatible with a wider distribution of cultural qualifications 
and powers. Such attributes are present in both preindustrial crafts and 
modern professions. They include the vocational investment of technical 
subjects in their work, collegial forms of self-organization, and the technical 
integration of a wide range of life-enhancing values, beyond the mere 
pursuit of profit or power. Today these dimensions of technology can be 
brought into play only in the context of the democratic reorganization of 
industrial society, which they make possible. (Feenberg 2002: 35) 
 
Conclusion 
In my view, Feenberg’s theory has great merit, in particular his thesis that 
technology is neither neutral nor in itself ‘evil,’ but a concretization of ethical 
implications and values incorporated in objects and procedures, a thesis sustained in a 
similar form by other authors like Grunwald (see Grunwald 2002) or Bunge (see Bunge 
1977). On the other hand, Feenberg’s theory is also based on a kind of wishful thinking, 
namely the old utopian hope that man is capable of realising a just and human form of 
political coexistence. A look at history, however, seems to advise us to be more 
sceptical. Given the inability of man to realize his ideals of justice and the good life, it 
seems to me more likely that in the long run man will tend to produce the abilities of 
reflection, awareness, ethical decision-making and social control, hitherto exclusively 
attributed to himself, in technological products, and thus passing over on them the 
burden of constructing a better world. This idea, like all other ideas of man, unites both 
dystopian and utopian moments, and if, in the form predicted here, it actually becomes a 
stronger reality than it already is today, it will undoubtedly present new challenges that 
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